The handbook of negotiation and culture pdf

I woudl add that in Face situations, like Japan, expect to meet second tier teams first who test your resolve and trustworthiness and a deal is made in the making as well as in the delivery. Participating in drinking sessions and eating local food is all part of the process, especially Southern Chinese. Having worked in the ME and parts of Africa, there is a different pace here and the idea of Honour is very important and question this is a bad move, but the time frames are different to Western ones so remember this and again sharing in hospitality is important as part of the culture.

Africa is a real mixed bag with a mixture of all three and knowing the history of the country and its development is essential, for example in Angola one needs to acknowledge their independence and build trust, and in Southern Africa trust is critical to make any progress.

Latam is complicated with a lack of trust historically laying a very poor foundation so it takes a lot of time to get this up and going, I found joint problem solving and finding workable solutions and being closely involved helped over come this aspect. Click here to cancel reply. Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Preparing for Negotiation Understanding how to arrange the meeting space is a key aspect of preparing for negotiation.

This discussion was held at the 3 day executive education workshop for senior executives at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Remember Me This setting should only be used on your home or work computer. Lost your password? Create a new password of your choice. All rights reserved. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published.

Carroll, Bazerman, and Maury, : Tendency to ignore contingencies when negotiators are faced with uncertainty. Blount and Larrick : Inability to accurately predict the effect of bargaining procedures on ones opponent. Bottom and Paese : Tendency to think that ones counterpart can concede more than she or he really could; this leads to greater negotiation outcomes.

Rothbart and Hallmark : Tendency to believe that coercion works effectively on enemies but not the self. Other-perception biases are beliefs and judgments about another party that also deviate from those made by an objective observer. Self-perception Biases One of the most well-documented self-perception biases is the tendency for peoples own position or point of view to affect their ability to process information in an objective and even-handed fashion.

For example, Kronzon and Darley showed people a lm of a dyadic negotiation after which participants made judgments about perpetrators and victims with regard to the use of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics. Some people were told to take the perspective of the victim; others were told to take the perspective of the perpetrator. Even though the lms were identical, the differences in perception led to differential evaluations of behavior, with perpetratorfocused participants more favorable of the perpetrators actions.

Galinsky and Moskowitzs ; also Galinsky, ; Jones and Nisbett, studies of perspective taking also found that the ability to entertain the position of the other affects attributional thinking and evaluations of others. They showed that perspective-taking decreases out-group stereotyping and improves outgroup evaluations in comparison to the stereotype suppression strategy. They suggested this is because the perspective takers thoughts about the target are.

The representation of the target constructed by the perspective taker comes to resemble the perspective takers own selfrepresentation. Further, negotiators with greater perspective-taking ability are more successful in achieving integrative agreements than negotiators with less perspective-taking ability Neale and Bazerman, One of the consequences of self-focus is that ones beliefs, attitudes, and physical appearance are highly salient to the self.

Moreover, people tend to overestimate the extent to which others can discern their internal states. Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec provided evidence for such an illusion of transparency. They showed, in different contexts, that people often mistakenly believe that their internal states are more apparent than they actually are; for instance, liars tended to overestimate the detectability of their lies.

Compelling evidence indicates that the illusion of transparency occurs in negotiations. Keysar, Ginzel and Bazerman demonstrated that negotiators tend to behave as if their negotiating counterparts had access to the negotiators privileged information about a given state of affairs.

Vorauer and Claude showed that negotiators overestimated the transparency of their objectives: they presumed that their objectives were more readily apparent to others than was, in fact, the case. Biased Perceptions of Others There has been a great deal of research on the biased views that individuals hold about others Fiske, Perhaps the most well-known bias in negotiation is the xed-pie perception Bazerman, ; Bazerman and Neale, ; Thompson and Hastie, The xed-pie perception is the erroneous belief that the other partys interests are directly opposed to ones own interests when, in fact, they are often not completely opposed.

Such a belief may be caused by the same judgment process that creates false consensus. Specically, bargainers reliance on their own preferences as a cue to others preferences should lead them to anticipate a xed-sum conict Bottom and Paese, Thompson and Hastie explored the consequences for outcomes. They measured individual xed-pie perceptions after just ve minutes of negotiation and found they predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that xed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint prots.

Negotiators with strong xed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be protably logrolled or that were completely compatible.

Pinkley, Grifth, and Northcraft suggested that this effect occurs through two different, independent mechanisms: biased information search negotiators faulty search for necessary information and biased information processing negotiators faulty processing of available information. According to Robinson et al. When they realize that the other sides views differ from their own, they rst attempt to straighten out the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist.

That is, partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case. In the context of face-to-face negotiations, this overestimate of the differences in construal between partisan perceivers and the other side has two consequences.

First, it exacerbates conict, as partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation Keltner and Robinson, ; Robinson and Kray, Second, it reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations Keltner and Robinson, Another relation of the xed-pie perception is the reactive devaluation bias Oskamp, ; Ross and Stillinger, , in which negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the other party merely as a function of who is offering them.

This was rst demonstrated by Oskamp , who asked participants to evaluate the utility of various options concerning U. Soviet disarmament. All participants evaluated identical options, with the only difference being who ostensibly was the author of the option the U.

Evaluations were strongly determined by the author regardless of the actual contents of the proposal.

Stillinger, Epelbaum, Kelter, and Ross extended this idea to face-to-face negotiation. In their experiment, participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university regarding a political issue. The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant. During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn position.

In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession; in the third control condition, no concession at all was made.

Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and signicance of a number of different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session. Nonoffered concessions were rated as more attractive and signicant than offered concessions: The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its value in the eyes of the participants. The xed-pie perception and extremism bias are also closely related to the fundamental attribution error Ross, , which states that people tend to view their own behavior as largely determined by the situation but regard others behavior as driven by chronic dispositions.

Recently, Morris, Larrick and Su demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation. In their studies, negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining behaviors. They determined that this fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufcient information about the opponents situation.

The research on differential attributions is closely tied to the coercion bias, identied by Rothbart and Hallmark , in which people erroneously believe that coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponents, but believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effectthat is, to increase their resolve not to concede.

Rothbart and Hallmark found that in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efcacy of coercion and conciliation as social inuence strategies. Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others, while in-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.

Another line of research suggests that individuals are largely unable or unwilling to take the perspective of others. Neale and Bazerman referred to these asymmetries as ignoring the cognitions of others. Samuelson and Bazermans study on the winners curse demonstrated that negotiators fail to incorporate valuable information about the decisions made by their opponents, due to their development of strategies to simplify competitive decisions Carroll, Bazerman, and Maury, Carroll and his colleagues suggested that this tendency to ignore the cognitions of others may actually be just one manifestation of a more general bias that consists of ignoring contingencies.

Individuals may have a general tendency to make simplifying assumptions when faced with a task that requires incorporating knowledge about future contingent events. That is, when individuals are faced with contingencies, they will make simplifying assumptions to make decision making under uncertainty more manageable.

More recently, Blount and Larrick examined the factors that led people to choose between two alternative ways of playing the ultimatum bargaining game with another party e. Subjects failed to select the version of the ultimatum bargaining game that maximized their monetary outcomes the latter version. This was partially due to their cognitive inability to accurately predict the effect of the alternative versions on their opponents responses.

Summary The social perception approach to the study of negotiator bias has been fed by the rich stream of person perception research in social psychology cf. Asch, ; Heider, ; Kelley, This social perception approach is grounded in the psychological principles of cognition, but it moves away. The research on attributional processes is the keystone of the social perception approach, perhaps as a result of its grounding in the psychological principles of cognition.

Still, this approach does not provide a meaningful account of the goals and motivations that drive negotiators, a factor that is critical for what Raiffa referred to as the mixed motive nature of negotiation. This shortcoming has encouraged the study of motivational biases in negotiation. Whereas social perception biases are thought to be chronically present, motivational biases can be turned on with the presence of particular social goals. Obviously, there is a myriad of possible goal states that affect judgment, behavior, and outcomes.

Our review of the literature surfaced four key motivational goals: self-enhancement, closure and consistency, cooperation maximization of shared goals , and accountability or constituency pressure ; see Table 1. Whereas some of these motivations may appear on the surface to be quite cool as they pertain to the organization of cognition, they are commonly viewed as tension and drive states that spur cognitive action.

Self-enhancement as a Motivational Goal One of the most fundamental goals of human life is the preservation and maintenance of self-identity. Identity enhancement is thought to be extremely important for mental health Taylor and Brown, , with the general nding being that self-serving behavior increases well-being.

Selfenhancement, while related to egocentrism, is not quite the same. Egocentrism is the tendency for people to take credit for behaviors, both good and bad. Self-enhancement is one theoretical explanation for egocentrism. In a mixed-motive situation, self-enhancement may lead to more problematic negotiations. Indeed, in a series of three studies, De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert found that negotiators tend to make self-serving evaluations of conict behavior.

Disputants viewed their own conict behaviors as more constructive and as less destructive than those of their opponents. Besides, self-serving evaluation of conict behavior was associated with increased frustration, reduced problem solving, and enhanced likelihood of future conict. Thus, self-enhancement may be a central motivational antecedent of conict escalation.

In social dilemmas, egocentrism leads negotiators to perceive fairness in a biased manner Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, and Bazerman, , ; cf. Thompson and Loewenstein, Specically, the egocentric bias tends to make parties believe that it is fair for them to have more of the negotiated. Self-identity and afrmation Closure, consistency, and balance Bittersweet effect Need for closure.

De Dreu, Nauta, and van de Vliert : Self-serving evaluation of conict behavior leads to reduced problem solving and greater likelihood of future conict. Bastardi : Negotiators have a need to preserve self-identity, which can be attenuated if they have recently afrmed the self. Thompson, Valley, and Kramer : Tendency to feel bad if you think the opponent has succeeded. De Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma : Negotiators with high vs.

Axelrod : Indenite time horizon creates an incentive to cooperate. Heide and Miner : Anticipated open-ended future interaction and frequency of contact increase the chances that cooperation emerges.

De Dreu and Boles : Social value orientation inuences choice and recall of heuristics in individuals preparing for negotiation.

Thompson and DeHarpport : Ability to capitalize on joint interests decreases heavily when only one of the parties has a communal orientation. Ben-Yoav and Pruitt a : Accountability reduces or increases joint benet when expectation of cooperative future interaction is absent or present.

Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton : Shared social identity leads to greater equality; high accountability leads to greater equality of outcomes. Wilson : Wanting to save face leads to negotiators being more aggressive and uncompromising. This is also a self-enhancement process. In addition, egocentrism leads parties to anticipate that others will make overharvesting decisions and deplete common goods Wade-Benzoni et al.

As Wade-Benzoni and her colleagues demonstrated, this, in turn, leads all parties to engage in overharvesting. Another problematic consequence of selfenhancement is that the motivation to maintain high self-esteem contributes to negotiator overcondence and overly positive self-evaluation Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke, Negotiators overcondence may vary with the tactics they use.

Some ndings by Barry suggested that negotiators might be more likely to consider themselves efcient and be prone to self-enhancement biases when using emotional tactics such as strategic expression of surprise, disappointment, or nervousness than when using cognitive tactics such as misrepresentation and false promises.

Self-afrmation theory Steele, argues that when people experience a threat to their self-esteem, they need to afrm the self. For example, when people are given feedback indicating that they have not performed well on a task, they are more likely to promote themselves, and this may have negative consequences for interpersonal and intergroup relations.

In particular, selfimage maintenance processes may play an important role in stereotyping and prejudice. When people evaluate a member of a stereotyped group, they are more likely to evaluate that person stereotypically if their self-images have been threatened by negative feedback Fein and Spencer, Besides, as Fein and Spencer documented, derogating a stereotyped target increases the self-esteem of people whose self-image has been threatened.

Bastardi examined self-afrmation processes in interpersonal negotiation. First, he either made prochoice negotiators identity salient or not. Then, he had them negotiate over abortion laws with an ostensibly prolife confederate.

Among negotiators whose identity was made salient prior to the negotiation, those who had previously afrmed a valued aspect of identity unrelated to.

Among negotiators whose identity was not made salient, the afrmation versus threat manipulation was not signicant. Overall, this suggests that negotiators need to preserve their identity can be attenuated if they have recently afrmed the self or if their identity was not made salient. At the intergroup bargaining level, however, some research suggests that the effect of self-afrmation on the unwillingness to make concessions may not only be limited to negative evaluation but occurs whenever identity is made salient cf.

Tjosvold, Tjosvold reported that representatives who received a strong afrmation of personal effectiveness a positive evaluation from their group resisted compromising when negotiating with the bargaining representative of an out-group, thereby maintaining their image of competence. There is evidence that goals can affect negotiator behavior and outcomes at a level below a persons awareness. Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky found that whereas men outperform women in a mixed-gender negotiation, when women are primed with classic gender stereotypes i.

According to Kray and her colleagues Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson, ; Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky, , stereotype reactance occurs when members of traditionally disadvantaged groups in this case, women are reminded of the stereotype. Moreover, the key mechanism by which stereotype activation affects behavior is negotiators aspirations, or goals Kray et al.

Cooperation as a Goal Several theoretical treatments of negotiation have examined the nature of cooperative, competitive, and individualistic goals on negotiation behavior for a review, see Polzer and Neale, ; and De Dreu, Chapter 5, this volume. In general, this research has consistently found that negotiators who anticipate future interaction with another party e. Closure as a Motivational Goal Webster and Kruglanski identied need for closure as a key socialinformation-processing goal.

Need for closure NFC refers to the notion that some situations elicit an epistemic state of wanting a quick solution through, for instance, time pressure and proximity to decision deadline. Overall, people are more likely to engage in thoughtful or novel information processing when their NFC is low.

Research on need for closure in negotiation reports that negotiators rely more on the use of heuristics in negotiation when they have a high dispositional need for closure De Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma, ; see De Dreu, Chapter 5, this volume, for a full review.

Need for closure also affects behaviors in group negotiation. Both dispositional and situational needs for closure are positively related to the preponderance of task-oriented behaviors and negatively related to the preponderance of positive socialemotional behaviors de Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, and Pierro, In fact, both types of NFC elicit conformity pressures and egalitarian participation in collective negotiations.

Accountability as a Goal In his model of the social perceiver as an intuitive politician, Tetlock proposed that accountability to constituents is a key goal. Negotiators who are accountable to their constituents make higher demands and are less willing to compromise than those not accountable to constituents Ben-Yoav and Pruitt, a; Carnevale, Pruitt, and Britton, ; OConnor, Two motivational processes may explain this nding: decision-making vigilance and evaluation apprehension.

Decision makers who are accountable for their actions are vigilant in that they consider relevant information and alternatives more carefully than those who are not accountable Tetlock, , Evaluation apprehension refers to the tendency for accountable negotiators to be concerned with how they are viewed by others and, consequently, to use face-saving strategies.

Research suggests that wanting to save face leads to negotiators being more aggressive and uncompromising in negotiation Neale, ; Wilson, While the general effect of accountability on the unwillingness of a negotiator to compromise has been well documented, this effect may be somewhat moderated by the nature of the accountability considered.

Indeed, Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger showed that people use different motivational strategies when dealing with different kinds of accountability to audiences. Specically, when people know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they shift their views toward those of the audience. Also, when people are accountable for positions to which they feel committed, they devote the majority of their mental effort to justifying those positions defensive bolstering.

However, when people do not know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they are motivated to think in relatively exible, multidimensional ways preemptive self-criticism.

Summary The motivational perspective on biases provides a compelling account of the conditions under which certain cognitive processesincluding the use of thoughtful information processingwill be engaged. Further, the motivational perspective also provides a theoretical framework for the activation of nonconscious goals.

The most commonly investigated motivational processes are cooperation and competition. Only recently has the motivational net been stretched to examine other, more complex, goals, such as accountability. Still, motives may not be sufcient to understand the complexity of affect in negotiation. Research on emotions in negotiation has only recently begun to gain momentum. Much like motivational biases, emotions direct our attention to certain aspects of the negotiation.

As a measure of their complexity and perhaps also a partial explanation for why negotiation scholars have ignored this hot aspect of the hot side of negotiation , emotions and mood states are viewed both as causes, as well as consequences, of negotiation.

Misperceptions of Affect Emotional biases can rst deal with misperceptions of ones or others affect. Emotional misperceptions may refer to any of several inconsistencies or reversals between feeling and actions, feelings and the judgments made about them, and feelings at different times of the negotiation for a review, see Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, and Kopelman, ; Thompson, Nadler, and Kim, Evidence suggests that negotiators exhibit biases in each of these areas see Table 1.

Reading Emotions in the Self and Others People have limited access to their own emotions Loewenstein and Schkade, , let alone the emotions of others around them. Moreover, people often mispredict why others feel the way they do Ekman, In addition, people misjudge the intensity of their feelings Keltner and Robinson, and are overcondent in their ability to predict others emotions Dunning, Grifn, Miljokovic, and Ross, Moreover, negotiators often fall prey to the illusion of transparency, such that they believe that others can read their emotions Gilovich et al.

Barry and Oliver : Argue that affect inuences decisions to negotiate, selection of opponent, formation of offers, tactics, concession making, economic outcomes, satisfaction with the outcomes, desire for future interaction, and respect of the agreement terms. Forgas a : Positive mood produces less critical reactions and more compliance than negative mood. Forgas b : Happy people more are likely to be cooperative and successful in both bilateral and intergroup negotiation.

Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke : Positive mood and motivation to maintain these lead to overcondence and positive self-evaluation. Pillutla and Murnighan : Wounded pride or spite leads to feelings of unfairness and rejection of offers that are objectively higher than alternatives. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia : Angry negotiators achieved fewer joint gains, without successfully claiming more value for themselves. Allred : Anger provokes a sequence of retaliatory impulses and behaviors.

Biases About the Duration of Emotional States Most people assume that emotional states last longer than they actually do. For example, people assume that positive events, such as winning the lottery, getting a raise, and so on, will have long-lasting effects on their overall happiness. People also assume that intensely negative events, such as getting red or being in an accident, will leave them unhappy forever. However, the emotional effects of extremely positive or negative events do not last nearly so long as negotiators might think Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, and Wheatley, According to the durability bias, people do.

However, because access to emotional states is limited Wilson, , people often err in assessing what they are feeling, which leads to errors in predicting their subsequent behavior.

Furthermore, when people try to introspect and monitor their feelings, it often leads to inconsistent behavior Wilson and Dunn, Consequences of Affect In addition to the emotional biases that result from misperceiving affect, emotional biases may also arise from the very affect that people experience in negotiations.

In general, negotiation researchers have essentially explored the consequences of two kinds of affect: 1 the consequences of diffuse affect or mood on negotiators information processing; and 2 the consequences of intense emotional feelings, such as anger, on negotiators judgment and behavior.

Because this literature is discussed in depth in Chapter 3 by Barry, Fulmer, and Van Kleef, we only briey discuss it here. Consequences of Diffuse Affect Emotional biases may arise from the inuence of mood and diffuse emotional states on cognition.

Specically, emotional biases result when mood or diffuse affective states inuence the quality and depth of information processing. One of the best-known perspectives on diffuse affect and information processing is state-dependent theory Bower, According to state-dependent theory, people show enhanced information-processing ability when the information being processed or the experience being thought of is affectively congruent with the mood they are in e.

There are few studies applying this theory to negotiation, although it had many applications to cooperative behavior in general.

More prosocial behaviors occur when people experience positive mood, and more antisocial behaviors occur when people experience negative mood e. In negotiation, good mood enhances, and bad mood reduces, the tendency to select a cooperative strategy in both bilateral and intergroup negotiation Forgas, b, Experiments 1 and 3.

In parallel to this, positive diffuse affect increases creativity and, consequently, the discovery of innovative negotiation. Negotiators in a good mood also tend to make more concessions during face-to-face negotiations Baron, , but this general concessionary tendency may not always be in the best interest of negotiators, as negotiations are not necessarily purely integrative.

Moreover, Kramer, Newton and Pommerenkes research pointed out that positive mood may enhance negotiators positive illusionsthat is, inaccurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future that one entertains to enhance and protect ones self-esteem Taylor and Brown, Thus, positive mood may not only have positive consequences for negotiators. Consequences of Intense Emotional Feelings Other research has examined the impact of intense emotions, as opposed to mood.

Whereas mood refers to low intensity, diffuse affect Fiske and Taylor, that may be exogenous to the negotiation process and need not be directed toward a person, emotion in negotiations implies intense feelings e. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia found that negotiators who were angry with each other achieved fewer joint gains and had less desire to work with each other in the future than did negotiators who had more positive emotional regard for each other see also Pillutla and Murnighan, Overall, at least three mechanisms may explain the negative impact of feelings of anger on negotiations.

First, angry negotiators are less accurate in judging the interests of opponent negotiators Allred et al. Second, negative emotions arising from a negative relationship make negotiators more self-centered in their preferences Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, , and being self-centered increases the difculty of coming to an agreement with others Thompson and Loewenstein, Third, anger may provoke a sequence of retaliatory impulses and behaviors Allred, Specically, people may become angry and act in a retaliatory way when they judge that the other party is responsible for some harm that was caused to them Allred, ; Allred, Chiongbian, and Parlamis, ; Weiner, , When harm is attributed to others disposition, anger may lead negotiators to fail to take into account the devastating consequences of retaliation and to dismiss the others perspective.

Finally, writing generally about emotions in negotiations, Thompson and her colleagues Thompson et al. They argued that emotions are contagious in the sense that others are inclined to express similar. Investigating this empirically, Thompson and Kim found that emotions can even affect the judgment of neutral, third-party observers; indeed, third parties are more effective when negotiators emotions are positive, holding constant the actual content of the dispute situation.

Summary Emotional biases are the newest foray into negotiator bias. This perspective emerging in social psychology as well as negotiation focuses on the hot aspect of cognition. Emotional biases have two distinct processes: initial states that result in particular behaviors and outcomes for the negotiators and end states that can be attributed to the use of certain behaviors and outcomes.

Thus, emotions serve as both independent and dependent variables in research investigations see Barry, Fulmer, and Van Kleef, Chapter 3, this volume. Conclusion Our review of bias in negotiation has several theoretical as well as practical implications.

The earliest papers on negotiator bias were direct descendants of the cognitive revolution. Even a cursory scan of the abstracts and key words reveals the zeitgeist of cognitive psychologys heyday, for example, heuristics, bias, error, framing, and schemas. We refer to this as the cognitive era. The next era of research ushered in a urry of research papers on social perception, attribution, and Gestalt processing.

This era came closely on the heels of the cognitive era, and indeed in some aspects predated the cognitive era. The next era of research papers on negotiation revealed the res of motivation, drive, and goals. The negotiator of this era was a goal-directed, hot-blooded, driven creature. The most recent era is that of the emotional negotiator, also a hot-blooded social actor.

No doubt the current research focus in social psychology on emotional intelligence and emotional informational processing largely shaped this research tradition. Our analysis of the theoretical and empirical research on bias in negotiation reveals important assumptions about negotiation, its actors, and the very process of negotiation. Yet, in the end, it is clear that we are studyingin all its varietythe ways in which negotiators think about the negotiation process and, as a result of this thinking or lack thereof , how they behave in the context of the mixed-motive,.

It is worth speculating on what might be the next era of research on negotiation and, in particular, negotiator bias. A look at the recent research in related elds of social psychology and cognitive psychology provide some important clues.

Here we outline three new directions in the study of negotiator bias, expressed as metaphors: the preconscious negotiator, the situated negotiator, and the learning organism. Preconscious Negotiator This metaphor describes the behavior of an actor who is largely inuenced by the operation of mental processes and states for which the actor has little or no direct awareness.

This new research tradition in social psychology is largely heralded by three independent streams of researchBarghs research Bargh, Chen, and Burrows, ; Bargh, Lombardi, and Higgins, on automotive behavior, in which he primes constructs at a level below peoples awareness and nds dramatic effects on judgment, perception, and behavior; Greenwald and Banajis work on implicit stereotyping; and Wegners work on control and automaticity in social life e.

One can easily imagine how negotiation behavior might be affected by the activation of constructs and processes at a level below the negotiators awareness. Kray, Thompson, and Galinskys research on male and female behavior and performance in negotiation revealed that the subtle activation of gender-relevant stereotypes can dramatically affect behavior. Situated Negotiator This metaphor represents a distinct departureeven a backlashagainst traditional information-processing theory, which largely forms the basis of the cognitive approach.

According to the situated cognition approach, cognition, and consequently its products such as bias , are situated in particular contexts and encounters and cannot be reduced to individual cognitions, as is often done in social psychology wherein mood states are manipulated or measured at the individual level Argote, ; Wegner, , Research in negotiation Thompson and DeHarpport, , and group decision making Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, and Neale, ; Phillips, Mannix, Neale, and Gruenfeld, illustrates the situated nature of the social interaction.

For example, rather than measuring or manipulating mood states at an individual level, the situated approach might focus on how the emotion is experienced or expressed by the dyad or group as a whole.

The situated negotiator point of view suggests that the proper level of analysis is that of the dyad, group, or organization. Indeed, the very nature of. Negotiator as Learner Any discussion of negotiator bias naturally raises the question of how to eliminate it. Consequently, a large research literature has focused on ways to reduce the impact of biases on negotiator behavior. In recent years, the focus of learning has received attention at all levels individual, group, and organization and from a variety of theoretical approaches psychology, sociology, education, and operations research.

In this tradition, the negotiator is viewed as a learning organism. One promising approach is the recent work by Thompson and her colleagues on analogical learning. The basic idea of learning via analogy is this: participants are given an opportunity to solve a problem. Later, they are challenged with a different, novel problem to solve that is from a different domain, thus appearing on the surface to have little or nothing to do with the rst problem.

However, the underlying or deep structure of the two problems is quite similar. The critical question is: Under what conditions will the negotiator recognize the applicability of the old problem in this new domain? Research suggests that practice comparing the structure of different cases is superior to deeply analyzing one case at a time e. This question is obviously relevant to our previous discussion of learning. The research on learning points to three critical ndings that make the elimination of biases particularly challenging: rst, most people severely overestimate their ability to learn from experience Dawes, ; Thompson, a, b ; second, learning is highly context specic, such that people are often unable to apply a principle or concept learned in one context to another equally relevant but different situation cf.

Another important implication of our research review is that to be a successful negotiator, one does not have to be perfect; just noticeably better than his or her counterpart. Although our review of the four types of biases may make any negotiator feel somewhat discouraged, we largely agree with Raiffas description of the truly rational negotiatorsomeone who understands not only how the self and the counterpart should behave but also how the self and counterpart actually behave, in terms of emotions, motivations,.

Thus, understanding what triggers these biases and how they inuence negotiators behaviors and developing ways to reduce their impact are challenging goals for both scholars and practitioners of negotiation.

Notes 1. We did not adhere religiously to this particular caveat. For example, given the relative paucity of empirical research on emotions in negotiations, we chose to include empirical studies that, while not specically involving a negotiation, shed light on the impact that emotions have on actors in multimotive social situations.

There is an ongoing debate about the relation between anchoring and adjustment. Recent research indicates that anchoring may not need necessarily to involve some kind of adjustment process to occur in individual, estimate tasks e.

Specically, anchoring without adjustment would occur when anchors are irrelevant to the task, as this was the case in the original study by Tversky and Kahneman. Then, anchoring may be nothing else than a special case of priming Mussweiler and Strack, ; Strack and Mussweiler, In negotiation research, however, the anchors that have been empirically examined always deal with the negotiation, either directly e.

Thus, they are relevant, and it seems plausible to argue that adjustment does indeed occur in negotiation context. Works Cited Allred, K. Judgment, anger, and retaliation: A new perspective on non-cooperation in organizations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

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Zanna, J. Olson, and C. Global business management issues and concerns are complex, diverse, changing, and often intractable. Industry actors and policy makers alike rely upon partnerships and alliances for developing and growing sustainable business organizations and ventures.

As a result, global business leaders must be well-versed in managing and leading multidimensional human relationships and business networks — requiring skill and expertise in conducting the negotiation processes that these entail.

This text will appeal to scholars and researchers in international business, cross-cultural studies, and conflict management who seek to understand the challenges of intercultural communication and negotiation. It will provide trainers and consultants with the insights they need to prepare their clients for intercultural negotiation. Finally, the text will appeal to businesspeople who find themselves heading out to engage with counterparts in another country, or operating in other multinational environments on a regular basis.

Moreover, this volume provides managers with applied strategies for negotiating effectively with the counterpart in the global context. Skip to main content Skip to table of contents. Advertisement Hide. This service is more advanced with JavaScript available. Front Matter Pages i-xxx. Front Matter Pages Pages